The UK HSE in its publication 'Out of Control' identified that
circa 60% of the causes of incidents could be attributed to lack or
poor specification and then errors in the design and
implementation. A further circa 6 % was attributable to
Installation and Commissioning.
In addition it is a requirement of DSEAR, (ATEX 137) is to verify
that places containing explosive atmospheres can operate in
accordance with the regulations. That is, to verify by competent
personnel that it is safe to introduce 'dangerous substances' into
the unit.
Specifically for electrical equipment in zoned areas these are
the standards to follow - EN 60079 -17 and EN 61241 - 17. In these
standards there is a need to carry out a full detailed initial
inspection of the installation and equipment to verify full
compliance to the specification and design.
Further where Safety Instrumented Functions are employed to
reduce the risk to people/environment that are subject to EN
61508/61511 then there is the requirement to validate the total
installation and the functionality of each SIF as meeting the User
Requirement Specification.
A systematic and economical method of achieving the above is to
use a quality assurance check list by competent personnel. Such an
approach has the benefit of monitoring the installation against
specification and design for each type of equipment and system and
where a non-conformance is identified it is corrected early in the
installation programme. This will avoid costly modifications and
delays if only an 'end of construction' quality audit is done.
Also by using an independent organisation, from the installer,
along with your own operating/maintenance personnel it establishes
the initial records for 'life time' management of functional safety
and provides on the job training for those that will maintain the
unit.
The final validation of the function of the installation can then
be phased into the pre-commissioning and commissioning activities
providing a record of compliance and avoiding costly delays.
Under BS EN 61508 and IEC 61511 safety instrumented systems
require third party validation. Rowan House can provide competent
personnel to validate your installed safety systems.
Process control systems have their own specific
pre-commissioning/commissioning requirements.
Pre-commissioning and commissioning of instrument and control
systems falls broadly into two categories with the use of HMI
(Human Machine Interface) based on PC technology and control system
architecture based on TCP/IP networks: checking the field hardware
and its connectivity to the field cabinets, and checking the
control system network and the software of the basic control system
that interacts with the field signals (both control and graphics).
In the case of such technologies as Fieldbus and Profibus the field
and control network have tended to "merge" and this has to be
considered.
For the software side; most systems now allow configuration of
standard points and graphics as well as logic in a simulator. This
allows for testing of the various control loops, logic and
indications prior to installation on the actual control system
using the simulator; which can then be used for operator training
on the process - especially useful on a new process. Similarly,
simulator training is very useful for training new operators. It is
also preferable to have a set of templates (dynamos) for each type
of point (both control and graphic) as a standard pre-configured
set to allow consistency of application throughout the life of the
plant.
For "traditional IO" (standard 4-10mA, digital signals etc) the
usual point to point check for each IO from the field element to
the field cabinet still serves well. And for the user interface end
a check from field cabinet to diagnostic page for IO (and on to
constructed graphic) gives confidence the two parts of the system
are correct before final loop check field element to HMI.
For Fieldbus and Profibus type IO before hooking up instruments
to the bus, much like the point to point tests for standard loops
the installation should be checked for voltage levels and signal
amplitude and shape on each segment. Once that is satisfactory,
instruments can be added to the system, commissioned on the bus,
and checked through to the software configuration.
The control system network should also be checked for redundant
TCP/IP highway failures, switch failures and redundant controller
changeover. It should also be checked for its connection methods
and protection from the "outside world" i.e. connection to site
standard LAN for interaction with management systems and all the
dangers that can provide in terms of viruses etc.
Once the IO is fully connected, either by traditional IO or a
bus, full commissioning checks to the HMI can be carried out. At
this point, with the plant in a safe state in the field, span tests
of analogue inputs, digital signal checks, stroking of analogue
valves and discrete valves and logic can be carried out. If at all
possible, the process should then be run on a non hazardous
substance (water, air, nitrogen) to allow logic and control testing
before running the process on the intended feedstock for full
commissioning to take place with logic checks.
Trouble shooting of systems once installed needs a logical method
to break down the problem in to its constituent parts. The initial
indication and reporting of a fault can often be misleading - "its
the software" is a common complaint. If the plant and control
system has been commissioned correctly it is more likely to be the
software reacting to an abnormal condition on an instrument, valve,
or bus. Having said that, invariably the software is the sensible
place to start by looking at diagnostics and on line packages to
monitor the perceived fault and try and break it down into the
possible constituent faults - field instrument, field connection
(wire and junction boxes- whether bus or standard), termination at
cabinet. If they do not reveal the fault then start looking at the
IO configuration, control blocks and logic (including times allowed
for actions to take place). Examples of field faults are limit
switches giving uncertain valve positions, "slow" moving valves
causing logic to time out on position. An example of a software
problem is Fieldbus configuration with software module scan times
too fast compared to the bus (macro-cycle) time for that instrument
causing communications issues. This can occur if an instrument is
added to a bus and the segment macro-cycle time alters
significantly.
Rowan House can offer our Process Control experience and
knowledge to help commission and trouble-shoot your control
systems.
Rowan House has many combined years and diversity of experience
in this area and can provide systems and personnel to achieve the
above in a cost effective manner.